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Redefining the role of TPIMs in combatting ‘home-grown’ 
terrorism within the widening counter-terror framework 
 
Professor Helen Fenwick 
 
Abstract  
 
This article considers the current racheting up of the counter-terror response, triggering a 
mass of new and proposed counter-terror measures, partly in the Counter-Terrorism Bill 
2015, which include strengthening TPIMs, put forward mainly to combat the threat 
represented by British citizens who have fought for ISIS. It argues that proposals to 
strengthen TPIMs should not be influenced by the false promise that they can provide a 
pathway to prosecution, and considers whether, contrary to current proposals, the impact of 
certain of the new measures could render TPIMs otiose. It further argues that if strengthened 
measures on the control orders model are needed, on the argument that TPIMs in their current 
form cannot answer effectively to the current threat, consideration should be given to 
introducing enhanced TPIMs, already available under the ETPIMs Bill, which are 
accompanied by safeguards not available in relation to TPIMs. So doing, it will be argued, 
would tend to focus minds on the temporary and ‘emergency’ status of such measures rather 
than normalising them. 
 
Introduction   
 
2 
 
We are currently witnessing a game-changing moment in counter-terror terms: the 
government intends to add a number of very far-reaching non-trial-based new measures to the 
existing ones, partly in the Counter-terrorism Bill 2015, with further measures to follow in 
2015 depending on the result of the general election.
1
 They include strengthening TPIMs (in 
the new Bill, Part 2), the replacement for control orders, mainly to combat the threat 
represented by British citizens who have fought for ISIS
2
 or seek to travel to Iraq or Syria to 
do so. This therefore appears to be an opportune moment to reflect on the role of TPIMs 
within the current and changing counter-terror framework, and their relationship with 
prosecutions. 
 
Post 9/11, in tandem with its criminal justice response to terrorist activity, the UK 
government has relied on using non-trial-based liberty-invading measures with a view to 
preventing terrorist activity, where both prosecution or deportation appear to be unavailable 
as options. While such measures were initially used post 9/11 to imprison non-nationals, they 
have been used from 2012 onwards almost exclusively against nationals, and in their current 
form impose restrictions falling far short of imprisonment. Such measures currently take the 
form of TPIMs - terrorism prevention and investigation measures under the Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA).
3
 In the run up to the 5 year 
                                                 
1
 BBC: ‘David Cameron outlines new anti-terror measures to MPs’ 1st September 2014; 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-29008316 (last viewed 04.10.14). See also note 103 below. Theresa May 
confirmed at the Conservative party conference, in September 2014, that she would introduce a counter-
terrorism bill in November to strengthen TPIMs. The Counter-terrorism Bill 2015 was presented to Parliament 
on 26 November 2014 and had its second reading on 2
nd
 December. 
2
 The terrorist group variously known as ‘Islamic state of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS) or ‘Islamic State’ (IS).  
3
 For discussion, see: Helen Fenwick, “Designing ETPIMs around ECHR Review or Normalisation of 
‘Preventive’ Non-Trial-Based Executive Measures?” (2013) 76(5) Modern Law Review 876; Alexander Horne 
and Clive Walker, “The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011: one thing but not much the 
other?” (2012) Criminal Law Review 421. See David Anderson QC, “Terrorism Prevention and Investigatory 
Measures in 2012” First Report March 2013 (‘TPIMS in 2012’), paras 6.23, 11.33-38;  
http://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/publications/first-report-tpims?view=Binary (last viewed 
04.10.14). David Anderson comments at para 1.13 of the First Report that “[t]he journey from indefinite 
detention (2001) through control orders (2005) to TPIMs (2011) has been in a liberalising direction”.  
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renewal – or abandonment – of TPIMs, in 2015,4 in light of the new Bill and current 
proposals for increased counter-terror measures, this article sets out to consider the cases for 
abandoning TPIMs or assigning them to a different role, or strengthening them. It focuses in 
particular on one aspect of the scheme: the extent to which, if at all, TPIMs do or could 
genuinely represent a pathway to the criminal investigation and prosecution of these suspects, 
providing a possible exit strategy that would eventually allow reliance on these ‘emergency’ 
measures to be discontinued.
5
 It will be argued that reliance on a scheme deployed as an 
alternative to prosecutions as a means of facilitating criminal investigations, leading to 
prosecution, is self-contradictory. The formal framework is in place under TPIMs, as it was, to 
an extent, under control orders, to create the possibility of prosecution, but, this article will 
argue, in practice that framework has proved not only ineffective but inherently flawed since 
the twin aims of prosecution and prevention of terrorist-related activity cannot be realised 
under the same scheme, at least under a non-inquisitorial system. Thus the strengthening of 
TPIMs under the new Bill should be debated on that basis. 
 
This piece proceeds to consider new and proposed measures which could potentially obviate 
the need for reliance on TPIMs or on other measures on that model, either by enhancing the 
chances of successful prosecutions of terror suspects or by preventing or curbing 
radicalisation of potential suspects or by enabling the deportation or non-entry into the 
country of suspect British citizens. Most such measures, especially those wholly or mainly 
under executive as opposed to judicial control, create tensions with the ECHR, but such 
tensions could, it will be argued, be alleviated to an extent if adoption of further measures 
occurred on the basis that they could potentially lead to the abandonment or minimisation of 
TPIMs, rather than merely assuming that TPIMs, especially in ‘strengthened’ form, must 
                                                 
4
 TPIMA provides a 5 year renewal requirement, which will fall in 2015 under the new government; the review 
will provide an opportunity for considering the basis for the existence of such civil restriction measures. 
5
 The author has discussed the other aspects of the scheme elsewhere: see ‘Designing ETPIMs’ n 3.   
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remain as part of the newly accepted counter-terror infrastructure. It is further argued that in 
so far as there is a case for strengthening TPIMs due to the currently raised threat level, their 
role could be taken by existing measures available under the ETPIM Bill, as explained below, 
to be used only on a temporary basis as emergency measures. 
 
The changing nature of liberty-restricting civil measures post 9/11 
 
As is well documented, detention without trial under the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security 
Act 2001 Part 4, gave way to control orders in 2005, under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005 (PTA) which in turn were superseded by TPIMs. While detention without trial was 
abandoned due to the finding of the House of Lords that the scheme was not ECHR-
compliant,
6
 control orders were replaced by TPIMs as an aspect of the Coalition 
government’s policy in 2010 of creating a break with over-repressive state powers when the 
new government came to power.
7
 In contrast to Part 4, the control orders scheme was not 
rejected in its entirety by the judges, but instead was moulded into greater ECHR 
compliance,
8
 paving the way for the introduction of less repressive TPIMs. Indeed, TPIMA, 
in creating very light touch orders, imposed on the ‘reasonable belief’ standard, went further 
in the direction of such compliance than the judicial rulings on control orders required.
9
 The 
inception of TPIMA was, however, followed rapidly by the introduction of enhanced TPIMs 
                                                 
6
 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2005] 2 WLR 087. 
7
 The Justice Secretary wrote on this: “The primary role of any government is to keep its citizens safe and free. 
That means both protecting them from harm and protecting their hard-won liberties…” “Justice and Security 
Green Paper” Cm 8194, October 2011. Further changes designed to protect liberties were effected in the 
Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, for example, in relation to enhanced checks and balances governing counter-
terrorism related stop and search powers (ss59-61). 
8
 See Helen Fenwick, “Recalibrating ECHR Rights, and The Role of The Human Rights Act Post 9/11: 
Reasserting International Human Rights Norms in the ‘War On Terror’?” (2010) 63 Current Legal Problems 
153. See also Conor Gearty, who has commented that ‘the courts have drawn the repressive sting’ from the 
control orders scheme: “The Human Rights Act: An Academic Sceptic Changes His Mind but Not His Heart” 
(2010) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 582, 585-6.  
9
 In particular, forced relocation is not included in TPIMA and house detention, interpreted as meaning 14-16 
hours detention a day, has been replaced by an ‘overnight residence’ requirement: see further ‘Designing 
ETPIMs,’ n 3, 896-7. But forced relocation would be reinstated under the 2015 Bill clause 12. 
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under the Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill 2011 (ETPIM 
Bill), on the basis that TPIMs did not provide a regime stringent enough to deal with future 
possible terrorist threats; TPIMA made only very limited provision for reliance on ETPIMs.
10
 
The Bill is available to be brought forward at any time in an unspecified emergency situation; if 
passed, it would set up ETPIMs as forming a separate, parallel regime running alongside the 
TPIMs one. In terms of the obligations they can impose ETPIMs are indistinguishable from 
‘heavy touch’ control orders, and so would be in stronger tension with Article 5 ECHR.11 
ETPIMs can be imposed on a suspect previously subject to a TPIM even if no new terrorism-
related activity (TRA) is apparent.
12
 If the Bill was enacted suspects who had been subjected 
to TPIMs could be subjected to ETPIMs, so long as the existing evidence against them 
supported the case against them to the civil standard.
13
 In terms of the strength of the 
obligations that can be imposed, the ETPIMs Bill appears to represent a repudiation of the 
tendency that saw the introduction of TPIMs rather than control orders. 
 
In 2014 all the TPIMs in force bar one expired and were not renewed.
14
 Although it appeared 
in 2014 that TPIMs were still viewed as an accepted part of the counter-terror 
infrastructure,
15
 their use appeared to be “withering on the vine” according to the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights (JCHR).
16
 That was partly or largely because they were seen as 
                                                 
10
 The only provision that was made in that Act for ETPIMs applies where Parliament is in recess: s26 TPIMA. 
S26 provides a temporary power while Parliament is in recess to impose ‘enhanced measures’ if considered 
urgent.   
11
 See Schedule 1 ETPIMs Bill and Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2010] 3 WLR 51. See for 
discussion, ‘Designing ETPIMs’ n 3, 896-7; see also ‘Recalibrating ECHR Rights’ n 8, 190-2. 
12
 The new TRA referred to in the ETPIM Bill refers to TRA relevant to the imposition of an ETPIM, rather 
than to an existing TPIM (section 2(6)). 
13
 See ETPIM Bill clause 2(1). 
14
 All of the current TPIMs bar one had either run their course (2 years) or were not in force by February 2014 
(David Anderson QC (Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation) “Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures in 2013” Second Report March 2014 (‘TPIMs in 2013’) at p. 2 and Home Office ‘Terrorism 
Prevention and Investigation Measures (1 June 2014 to 31 August 2014’ 16 Oct 2014. 
15
 David Anderson recommended their retention: see ‘TPIMs in 2013’ n 14, at p. 4.   
16
 JCHR, “Post-legislative scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Act 2011” Tenth Report of Session 
2013-2014, HL 113 HC 1014, January 2014 (‘TPIMA 2011’) at p. 5. 
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ineffective: their role in providing security came under question when two suspects 
absconded in 2012 and 2013 while subject to TPIM orders.
17
  
 
Dissatisfaction with TPIMs led to proposals in 2013 to amend TPIMA in order to extend (and 
possibly strengthen) TPIMs.
18
 In August 2014 there were recommendations to reinstate 
control orders, mainly to combat the problem posed by British jihadis returning to Britain 
after fighting in Syria or Iraq for ISIS.
19
 When the terror threat level was raised from 
substantial to severe,
20
 triggering the announcement of the new package of counter-terror 
measures, one of them included strengthening TPIMs
21
 by inter alia allowing them to impose 
relocation, as control orders could do.
22
 However, that would again create the risk of 
                                                 
17
 On 1
st
 November 2013; see Rosa Silverman “Terror suspect absconds while being monitored” the Daily 
Telegraph 4
th
 November 2013. When he disappeared, Mr Mohamed was facing charges relating to 20 alleged 
breaches of his TPIM order. Mohamed was an alleged associate of Ibrahim Magag, another TPIM subject who 
absconded on 26
th
 December 2012. Chris Grayling ordered a review of the measures as a result, and David 
Anderson notes that changes were implemented on the basis of this review, but the results of the review are 
confidential (‘TPIMS in 2013’ n 14, paras 4.37,4.38). Yvette Cooper, Shadow Home Secretary has said on this 
(see ‘Cameron and Clegg seek agreement in anti-terror talks’ the Guardian 1st September 2014): "There are 
currently no Tpims in use because the experts have warned that the police and the security services do not 
believe they are effective enough to be worth using…" (see at http://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2014/sep/01/cameron-clegg-anti-terror-talks-british-born-jihadis-syria-iraq).  
18
 The Home Affairs Committee “Counter-terrorism” Seventeenth Report, HC 231, 30th April 2014 (‘Counter-
terrorism Seventeenth Report’), para 109 has found that TPIMs need to be strengthened to prevent absconding;  
Yvette Cooper, Shadow Home Secretary, has observed: "We warned from the start that weakening these crucial 
counter terror powers was a serious error of judgement by the Home Secretary… For so many TPIMs to end at 
once raises serious challenges for the police and security services - especially in London where most of the 
terror suspects are based” (Press Release 5th November 2013; 
http://www.politicshome.com/uk/article/87796/sign_up_pro.html (last viewed 04.10.14)). 
19
 From Yvette Cooper, the Shadow Home Secretary, Lord Carlile, the Government’s independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation from 2001 to 2011, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 
(speaking on LBC on 27
th
 August 2014, as reported in the Telegraph “British jihadists should be stripped of 
citizenship says top police officer” 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11058319/British-jihadists-should-be-stripped-of-
citizenship-says-top-police-officer.html (last viewed 04.10.14). 
20
 On 29
th
 August 2014 (see MI5 Press Release “Threat level to the UK from international terrorism raised to 
severe” https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/news/news-by-category/threat-level-updates/threat-level-to-the-uk-from-
international-terrorism-raised-to-severe.html (last viewed 04.10.14)). 
21
 HC Deb Vol. 585, Cols 24-6, 01.09.14. The Government had previously stated that it intends to carry out a 
review of TPIMs as part of a broader review of counter-terrorism powers: JCHR ‘TPIMA 2011’ n 16, para 82. 
David Cameron’s Task-force for Tackling Violent Extremism had also recommended a range of changes in 
2013: “Tackling Extremis in the UK,” December 2013; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/263181/ETF_FINAL.pdf (last 
viewed 04.10.14).  
22
 That had also been recommended earlier in 2014 by David Anderson, the current independent reviewer of 
terrorism legislation: ‘TPIMS in 2013’ n 14, p. 57, recommendation 4. See n9 above as regards the 2015 Bill. 
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breaching Article 5 ECHR,
23
 and the Coalition government is clearly seeking to avoid 
following the Blair government’s example of introducing draconian measures that are then 
watered down by the courts. Counter-terrorism rhetoric failed to match reality. But a 
continued preoccupation with reliance on such civil restriction measures is apparent, 
combined with vacillation as to the extent to which they can be allowed, as non-trial-based 
measures, to invade liberty.      
 
Advantages of relying on non-trial-based executive measures 
 
After the abandonment of control orders from 2012 onwards there continued to be acceptance 
from the independent terrorism reviewer, David Anderson QC, and to an extent within 
Parliament, that employment of executive measures on the control order/TPIMs model should 
remain a vital part of counter-terror policy due to the difficulties of prosecuting a certain 
group of suspects,
24
 but it also appeared to be accepted that the measures should continue to 
be sparingly invoked.
25
 The Parliamentary Committee on ETPIMs accepted that the reasons 
for imposing a control order/TPIM on a particular suspect, as opposed to pursuing a 
                                                                                                                                                        
David Anderson also recommended an extra power to compel attendance at meetings to establish 
communication with subjects, recommendation 6 (p. 57). 
23
 Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP [2010] 3 WLR 51. 
24
 Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2013,’ n 14, p. 4; the Joint Committee on ETPIMs agreed that there was a need for such 
measures, see ‘Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill’ First Report Session 
2012-2013 HL 70 / HC 495, November 2012, (‘Draft ETPIM Bill First Report’) paras 90-100.  
25
 The government has recorded a commitment to use other measures, particularly prosecution or deportation, 
wherever possible; see eg “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism” July 2011 
1.18 et seq; https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97994/contest-
summary.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14). The result of this commitment is that few individuals have been subject to 
such measures. Around 45 people were, at various points, subjected to control orders: JCHR 16
th
 Report 
‘Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill’ Session 2010-12, HL 180 / HC 
1482, July 2011. See also: Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill ECHR Memorandum by the 
Home Office https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/98372/echr-
memorandum.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14); only 9 TPIMs were imposed and as indicated above almost all of the 
last ones expired in February 2014 (see ‘TPIMs in 2013’ n 14 at p. 2).  
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prosecution, may not be openly scrutinised on national security grounds,
26
 but that imposing 
such measures remained necessary.
27
 The Counter-terror review 2011 had considered whether 
such measures should be maintained
28
 rather than relying on surveillance,
29
 concluding that 
while increased covert investigative resources could form an important part of any 
arrangements replacing control orders, surveillance alone could not mitigate risk to the level 
created by a regime on the control order model,
30
 although such a regime should be much 
more closely linked to the criminal process than control orders had been.
31
 The Security 
services have taken the position in responses to the independent reviewer that it is more 
resource-intensive to engage in extensive surveillance of certain suspects than it is to impose 
a control order/TPIM.
32
 David Anderson considers not only that control orders have been 
effective in containing the threat, but that their use also releases resources for surveillance of 
other targets – which may represent a more serious threat.33  
 
                                                 
26
 Ie there are security-based reasons for being unable to prosecute; see Joint Committee on ETPIMs, ‘Draft 
ETPIM Bill First Report,’ n 24, para 98. This author submitted to the committee that the SIAC transcript in 
relation to E’s challenge to Part 4 ACTSA (PTA/21/2007; see SSHD v E [2008] EWHC 585, 2008 WL 
2148299) indicated that there appeared to be enough evidence to sustain a prosecution, but that the reasons were 
not given on the presumed basis that to give them would undermine national security: Transcript of Professor 
Fenwick’s evidence before Joint Committee on ETPIMs ‘Draft ETPIM Bill: Oral Evidence’, December 2012 at 
p. 46; http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-
committees/Draft%20ETPIMS%20Bill/JC%20on%20Draft%20EPIMS%20Bill%20-
%20consolidated%20oral%20evidence%20PUBLISHED.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14).  
27
 The Committee found in 2012: “the government must devise a system to tackle the ongoing terrorist threat 
from those who cannot – for whatever reason – be deported or safely prosecuted”: Joint Committee on ETPIMs, 
‘Draft ETPIM Bill First Report’, n 24, para 99.  
28
 Secretary of State for the Home Department: “Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers” Cm 8004, 
January 2011 (hereafter ‘Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers 2011’) at p. 36. 
29
 The Review received submissions from the police and the security agencies to the effect that surveillance is 
capable of both monitoring suspects’ activities and facilitating evidence-gathering processes, which can lead to 
prosecution and conviction, but that it does not of itself necessarily prevent or disrupt any terrorism linked 
activities: ibid p. 38; see also Joint Committee on ETPIMs, ‘Draft ETPIM Bill First Report,’ n 24, para 99. 
30
 See ‘Review of Counter-Terrorism and Security Powers 2011,’ n 28, at p. 38. 
31
 Ibid p.40 para 21(a). 
32
 Secretary of State for the Home Department “The government response to the Report by David Anderson QC 
Seventh Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to Section 14(3) of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
2005”, Cm 8443, September 2012 (‘The Government Response to the Seventh Report’) at p. 6. 
33
 David Anderson QC Independent Reviewer of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) pursuant to s14(6) PTA 
“Control Orders in 2011” Seventh Report March 2012, executive summary; see at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/other/9780108511417/9780108511417.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14). 
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Creating a pathway from imposing non-trial-based measures to 
prosecution for terrorism offences? 
 
Both the TPIMs and ETPIMs schemes were presented as resembling the control orders one in 
its preventive aspect, but the use in the titles of both instruments of the term ‘Investigation’ 
was intended to indicate that both schemes, in contrast to the control orders one, have a more 
genuinely significant investigative element. The emphasis on investigations was intended to 
indicate that use of non-trial-based measures could provide a pathway to prosecutions, 
meaning that some measures could eventually be abandoned in favour of use of the criminal 
law and criminal justice system. The use of such measures for investigation is referred to in 
the UK’s Pursue strategy34 which finds that they are designed to “provide security” while 
enabling the “collection of evidence which can lead to prosecution”.35   
 
Investigative role of TPIMs and ETPIMs: opportunities for collecting data  
 
The government response to the Counter-Terror review, as indicated above, accepted that 
TPIMs should have the dual role of curbing and controlling the activities of suspects, as well 
as allowing increased surveillance of them, with a view to a prosecution.
36
 Control orders, 
especially the earlier ‘heavy touch’ ones, clearly placed the emphasis most firmly on their 
preventive role, disregarding their investigative one in terms of the obligations imposed. The 
ban on forms of electronic communication combined with house detention, relocation and 
interference with association meant that controlees were isolated from certain associates (who 
                                                 
34
 Secretary of State for the Home Department: “CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering 
Terrorism,” Cm 8123, July 2011, para 4.21. 
35
 Ibid para 4.3. 
36
 Secretary of State for the Home Department: “Draft Enhanced Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Bill,” Cm 8536, January 2013, para 2.12. 
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might also be suspects), meaning that their potential participation in suspected terrorist 
conspiracies was – in effect – placed in a state of suspense.37 The emphasis was on the 
isolation of the controlee, in physical and communicative terms. But restrictions on the use of 
communication technology also restricts it as a source of information to the security services. 
That aspect of the control orders scheme was severely criticised in the government’s 2011 
review of counter-terrorism and security powers
38
 on the basis that the suspect was placed in 
a form of limbo which made it unlikely that any new terrorism-related activity could occur 
which could be the subject of a prosecution. 
 
Interference with the suspect’s use of communications technology is also a significant aspect 
of TPIMs. But the level of interference was higher under control orders, and would be under 
ETPIMs,
39
 than it is under TPIMs. TPIMs relax the rules on access to forms of electronic 
communication,
40
 and do not at present allow for the physical isolation allowed for by control 
orders in the form of forced relocation or imposition of geographical boundaries.
41
 The 
rationale for such relaxation appeared to be that since the suspect is not as isolated from 
possible associates, terrorism-related activity might occur, or past occurrences of such 
activity might be revealed, leading to the possibility of a prosecution.  
 
Although ETPIMs also include the term ‘investigation’, the features of TPIMs that are 
viewed as potentially facilitating the possibility of prosecution are present to a significantly 
                                                 
37
 See eg L. Zedner, ‘Preventive Justice or Pre-punishment? The Case of Control Orders’ (2007) 60 CLP 174. 
38
 Secretary of State for the Home Department “Review of Counter-Terrorism powers” Lord MacDonald 
Report, Cm 8003, January 2011, para 29 et seq.  
39
 ETPIM Bill Sched 1 para 8. 
40
 Sched 1 para 7(1): ‘The Secretary of State must allow the individual to possess and use (at least) one of each 
of the following descriptions of device (subject to any conditions on such use as may be specified under sub-
para (2)(b)) – 3(a) a telephone operated by connection to a fixed line; 3(b) a computer that provides access to the 
internet by connection to a fixed line (including any apparatus necessary for that purpose); 3(c) a mobile 
telephone that does not provide access to the internet’. 
41
 Schedule 1 TPIMA para 2; TPIMA does not provide for general geographical restrictions but can bar the 
controlled person from entering specified locations. The 2015 Bill clause 12 will allow for the re-imposition of 
forced relocation. 
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lesser degree: a ban on most or all methods of electronic communication is possible,
42
 and the 
provisions creating social isolation are not only much more far-reaching under ETPIMs, but 
also include forced relocation,
43
 thus insulating the suspect from others in the way that 
control orders often did. Since ETPIMs resemble control orders in this respect, their potential 
as investigative measures appears to be diminished, so deployment of ETPIMs appears to 
represent a reneging on one of the core principles apparently underpinning the TPIMs regime.   
 
But it must be questioned whether relaxing the measures creating social isolation of suspects 
and use of communications technology in TPIMs is likely in practice to contribute much to 
the chances of gathering evidence that could be used in a prosecution. Suspects are aware that 
TPIMs are limited to two years and, as David Anderson has pointed out, they are likely to 
refrain from TRA for that time period,
44
 knowing that they are under suspicion and 
surveillance via the TPIM. In other words, they are likely to seek to sit out the TPIM rather 
than risk providing any evidence that could enhance the chance of a prosecution. The fact that 
none of the suspects subjected to TPIMs were prosecuted for terrorism offences (apart from 
breaches of the TPIM) supports this contention if it is assumed that some or all of those 
suspects would have engaged in TRA but for the TPIM. Thus if enhancing the chances of 
prosecution is in any event unlikely in respect of suspects subjected to TPIMs, the case for 
relaxation of the measures restricting communication or association cannot be supported by 
reference to such enhancement.  
 
Investigative and prosecutorial role of TPIMs/ETPIMs 
 
                                                 
42
 ETPIM Bill Sched 1 para 8. 
43
 ETPIM Bill Sched 1 para 1. 
44
 David Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2012,’ n 3, 8.13-8.16.  
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Control orders did contain a prosecutorial element which could have triggered criminal 
investigations, which was strengthened to an extent in TPIMA (and would apply also to 
ETPIMs) but not to the extent that a clear distinction between the two schemes in terms of 
enhancing the prospect of prosecution was created. As indicated, the relationship to 
prosecution as well as to investigation was supposed to be stronger under a TPIM or an 
ETPIM notice than a control order, in terms not only of enhancing the chances of 
prosecution, but in relation to the continuing review of that possibility.
45
 Under the PTA s8 
the relevant chief officer of police had to keep the prospects of prosecution under review, 
consulting the CPS as necessary. Under TPIMA this obligation is somewhat strengthened 
under s10, which also applies in relation to ETPIMs.
46
 There is a duty to consult the chief 
officer of the appropriate police force as to the prospects of prosecution
47
 before imposing a 
TPIM or an ETPIM.
48
 The chief officer must consult the relevant prosecuting authority 
before responding (s10(6)), although the duty to consult can be satisfied by a consultation 
that occurred previously (s10(9)). As far as TPIMs are concerned, this clearly refers to the 
previous consultation duty under the PTA s8. As regards this initial imposition of a TPIM, in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v CC, CF,
49
 the first case on TPIMA, it was 
noted that in MB v Secretary of State for the Home Department
50
 the Court of Appeal had 
stated that: “It is implicit in the scheme that if there is evidence that justifies the bringing of a 
criminal charge, a suspect will be prosecuted rather than made the subject of a control order.” 
The Court found that the same is true of TPIM notices. 
 
                                                 
45
 Secretary of State for the Home Department: “The Government Reply to the Sixteenth Report of the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights” Cm 8167, September 2011 (hereafter ‘Government Reply to the Sixteenth 
Report’) pp. 2-3.  
46
 Clause 3 ETPIM Bill.  
47
 Under s10(2) this means: “whether there is evidence available that could realistically be used for the purposes 
of prosecuting the individual for an offence relating to terrorism”. 
48
 Whether by the ‘urgent’ procedure allowing the Home Secretary to impose a TPIM (s7 TPIMA) or ETPIM (cl 
3 ETPIM Bill, s10(1) TPIMA) or when applying to a court under s6 TPIMA. 
49
 [2012] EWHC 2837 (Admin). 
50
 [2007] QB 415, para 53. 
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As regards continuing review of the prospects of prosecution the Secretary of State must 
inform the chief officer that the TPIM/ETPIM notice has been served (s10(4)), and the chief 
officer must “secure that the investigation of the individual’s conduct, with a view to a 
prosecution of the individual for an offence relating to terrorism, is kept under review 
throughout the period the TPIM [or ETPIM] notice is in force” (s10(5)). Thus the duty to 
keep the possibility of prosecution under review is slightly stronger under TPIMs/ETPIMs, 
since the chief officer must be consulted before the notice is imposed, but the danger that this 
process is merely part of a tokenistic, routinized, presentational exercise – as it appears to 
have been in relation to control orders – still remains.51 Prosecutions arose as a result of the 
review duty under s8 PTA. Given that the same persons were then subjected to TPIMs, the 
chances of a prosecution are low, in reality, and therefore the review process as regards 
prosecution has inevitably taken on a tokenistic, box-ticking air, as David Anderson has 
acknowledged.
52
    
 
On its face it appears to be questionable whether the duty as regards review of the chances of 
prosecution should be the same for ETPIMs as for TPIMs: it might appear that it should be 
higher, since ETPIMs have greater punitive impact. For example, it could be one of the 
requirements for the imposition of an ETPIM after a TPIM that there has been a multi-
agency
53
 assessment of the chances of a successful prosecution, and it has been found that at 
                                                 
51
 Liberty “Second Reading Briefing on the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill” June 2011 
paras 20, 37-38; http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy11/liberty-s-second-reading-briefing-on-
the-terrorism-prevention-and-investigat.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14).  
52
 The focus of TPIM review has moved decisively towards preventing breach rather than prosecutions: David 
Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2012,’ n 3, para 8.6; ‘TPIMs in 2013,’ n 14, para 4.24: “The nature and tone of [TPIM 
Review Group] meetings (some of which I attended) changed appreciably in the aftermath of the December 
2012 abscond... Police and MI5 were questioned in greater detail about the adequacy of measures to manage the 
national security risk posed by each subject, the assessed abscond risk and actions taken to mitigate it, the extent 
of overt monitoring and covert surveillance, breaches, activities of concern and proposed responses. They were 
challenged in particular to consider the potential benefits of tightening the measures on individual subjects…”  
53
 Eg involving police, security service personnel, and a barrister with relevant expertise. 
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present a prosecution would not succeed. A condition for the renewal of a TPIM after one 
year could include a similar review of the current feasibility of a prosecution.  
 
But if in reality the chances of prosecution are very low, tinkering with the review process for 
TPIMs/ETPIMs would merely amount to an empty exercise. The changes to the process 
made under TPIMA fail to address one of the fundamental barriers to prosecution, which is 
that the security services tend not to view prosecution as the appropriate process, due to the 
sensitive nature of the material on which the suspicion against the controlled person is based.  
So the extent to which TPIMA indicates a genuine allegiance to investigation and prosecution 
in comparison with the PTA may be doubted. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has 
attacked the TPIMs legislation in its current form due to its dual role, arguing that it does not 
go far enough in promoting criminal investigations and thus furthering criminal 
prosecutions.
54
 In essence it is argued that TPIMs still represent a strategy for temporarily 
‘neutralising’ terror suspects which operates as an alternative to using the criminal justice 
system, an argument that would apply a fortiori to ETPIMs.  The Joint Committee, when 
engaging in pre-legislative scrutiny, found that the TPIM Bill was clearly more committed to 
disruption and prevention than to investigation and prosecution.
55
 The Committee therefore 
recommended amendments to the Bill which would have linked TPIMs more strongly to the 
criminal justice process.
56
 Those amendments were not, however, accepted,
57
 and for obvious 
reasons there is likely to be little opportunity for their revival in relation to the ETPIM Bill. In 
its most recent report, conducting post-legislative scrutiny, the Committee found: ‘our 
                                                 
54
 JCHR ‘TPIMA 2011’ n 16, p. 13. 
55
 Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) 16
th
 Report ‘Legislative Scrutiny: Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures Bill’ HL 180, HC 1482 (2011) paras 1.11,1.12. 
56 “Amendments proposed by the committee included: when imposing TPIMs, the DPP (or relevant prosecuting 
authority) should be satisfied that a criminal investigation into any individual’s involvement in terrorism-related 
activity is justified, and will not be impeded by any of the measures imposed; provision for judicial supervision 
in relation to the ongoing criminal investigation…”, ibid p.2. 
57
 Secretary of State for the Home Department ‘Government Reply to the Sixteenth Report,’ n 45, pp. 5-6. 
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…scrutiny has failed to find any evidence that TPIMs have led in practice to any more 
criminal prosecutions of terror suspects.’58 
 
Abandoning TPIMs/ETPIMs in favour of prosecutions?   
 
The Communications Data Bill
59
 would have placed a duty on data controllers and Internet 
service providers to provide details to public authorities of messages sent on social media, 
webmail, voice calls over the internet, and gaming, in addition to emails, texts and phone 
calls.
60
 The duty to provide details would not have covered the content of communications,
61
 
but details, such as time sent, mode of communication – metadata.62 The Bill received 
significant support, especially after the Woolwich killing, including from two former Labour 
home secretaries, a security minister, and the former independent reviewer of terror laws; 
Theresa May also recently attacked the Liberal-Democrats for blocking it.
63
 It had however 
attracted significant criticism inside and outside Parliament, especially from the Liberal-
                                                 
58
 JCHR ‘TPIMA 2011,’ n 16, p. 3.  
59
 Until recently the government were revising the Communications and Data Bill; Lord Wallace of Saltaire, 
commenting on the status of the Bill, observed in March 2014 that “[t]e Government have been developing a 
draft communications data Bill on which we will all have to consider how we move forward, probably in the 
first Session of the next Parliament” HL Deb vol 752, col 1220, 4th March 2014. 
60
 The new regime was intended to replace Part 1 Chapter 2 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(“RIPA”) and Part II of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 (“ACTSA”) and was intended to sit 
alongside the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009, but this was declared invalid by the ECJ in 2014 
(Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (C-293/12) [2014] 
All ER (EC) 775.   
61
 Access to content is governed by Part 1, Chapter 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
(RIPA).  
62
 Secretary of State for the Home Department “Draft Communications Data Bill” Cm 8359, June 2011, para. 9. 
Clause 1 of the Bill enabled the Secretary of State, by order, to ensure that communications data was available 
to be obtained by the police and certain public authorities (under Part 2) for a “permitted purpose” as per RIPA 
s22(2). The duty was to be enforced by injunction or specific performance of a statutory duty under s45 of the 
Court of Sessions Act (cl 8(2)).  
63
 See Chris Mason “Tory-Labour Pact Could Save Data Bill, Says Lord Howard” BBC (26 May 2013), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22673156 (last viewed 04.10.14). Theresa May’s attack came at the 
Conservative Party conference – see A Travis the Guardian 30.9.14. 
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Democrats,
64
 and would possibly have been open to challenge under EU law. The European 
Court of Justice recently ruled that the 2006 Data Retention Directive is invalid on the 
grounds that it severely interferes with two fundamental rights: the right to respect for private 
life and to the protection of personal data.
65
  
 
One of the key powers provided for in the Bill – to impose a duty on telecommunications 
operators to retain data - was captured instead in the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers 
Act 2014
66
 which was rushed through Parliament in one day as an emergency measure, and 
recently received Royal Assent.
67
 So doing aroused suspicion in some quarters that 
introducing the new statute as an emergency measure was merely a means of evading the 
controversy surrounding the previous Bill,
68
 while ensuring that one of the powers the Bill 
would have provided were retained. But since data retention no longer has the backing of the 
EU such national legislation is open to challenge, although the 2014 Act provides a response 
to the ECJ judgment since it provides that the Secretary of State may enact safeguards 
limiting the content and use of data retained.
69
 
                                                 
64
 Nick Clegg, the Deputy Prime Minister, considered that he had won a very significant political victory when 
he prevented the draft bill being allowed into the Queen's speech 2013 (BBC “Nick Clegg: No ‘web snooping 
bill while Lib Dems in government” 25th April 2013; see at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-22292474).  
65
 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (C-293/12) [2014] 
All ER (EC) 775 para 65. 
66
 Section 1 of the 2014 Act provides: ‘The Secretary of State may by notice (a “retention notice”) require a 
public telecommunications operator to retain relevant communications data if the Secretary of State considers 
that the requirement is necessary and proportionate for one or more of the purposes falling within paragraphs (a) 
to (h) of section 22(2) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (purposes for which communications 
data may be obtained)’. The provisions will be amended under clause 17 of the 2015 Bill to cover data that can 
be used to identify an internet protocol address or other identifier. Section 1 applies to telephones (both landline 
and mobile) and to internet-based communications (including email, instant messaging, web-browsing, social 
media); see the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 2009 Schedule Pts 1-3. 
67
 On 17th July 2014. 
68
 Liberty: “Liberty Represents MPs David Davis and Tom Watson in legal challenge to Government’s 
‘emergency’ surveillance law” Press Release, 22nd July 2014; https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/news/press-releases/liberty-represents-mps-david-davis-and-tom-watson-legal-challenge-
government%E2%80%99s- (last viewed 04.10.14). 
69
 Data Retention Act 2014: s1(3) ‘The Secretary of State may by regulations make further provision about the 
retention of relevant communications data…’ s1(4) ‘Such provision may, in particular, include provision 
about— (a)requirements before giving a retention notice, (b)the maximum period for which data is to be 
retained under a retention notice, (c)the content, giving, coming into force, review, variation or revocation of a 
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Availability of such data might enhance the possibilities of prosecution in some instances, 
according to Lord Carlile,
70
 and might be of pertinence in relation to the current use of social 
media by ISIS and ISIS supporters in the UK to spread propaganda and aid in radicalisation. 
Making such data available would also arguably strengthen the case for allowing a minimum 
level of access to electronic communications under a TPIM, and some internet or phone 
access under an ETPIM, even though in that instance no minimum level is specified in the 
ETPIM Bill. Communications data (CD) are already being used in seeking to uncover and 
prosecute persons in relation to terrorist plots, via requests under Part 1 Chap 2 Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Those requests could now apply to a wider range of data but 
obviously would only be of value if the operators in question were under a duty to retain the 
data: s1 of the 2014 Act has the purpose of allowing such a duty to be imposed. The 
Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) has noted that CD can be 
immensely valuable: in the ISC’s Review of the 7/7 terrorist attacks, the Committee noted the 
scale of the 2003–04 Counter-Terrorism (CT) investigation known as Operation CREVICE 
(an investigation into a group of terrorists who were plotting to detonate a fertiliser bomb in 
the UK in 2004).
71
 At the time, this was the largest operation of its kind ever mounted by the 
Security Service and more than 4,000 telephone contacts were analysed.
72
 The ISC 
considered that the Communications Data Bill, if enacted, would provide the best solution to 
the problem of the declining availability of CD (due to use of new technology and unlimited 
phone tariffs);
73
 the 2014 legislation will now require the relevant companies to collect and 
                                                                                                                                                        
retention notice, (d)the integrity, security or protection of, access to, or the disclosure or destruction of, data 
retained by virtue of this section…’ 
70
 Lord Carlile of Berriew QC ‘Sixth Report of the Independent Reviewer Pursuant to s14(3) of the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2006’, 6 February 2011, para 76. 
71
 Prime Minister “Intelligence and Security Committee Annual Report 2011-12”, Cm 8403, July 2012 para 117. 
72
 See The Prime Minister “Access to communications Data by the Intelligence and Security Agencies” Cm 
8514, February 2013, para 18. 
73
 Ibid para 44. 
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retain the information in question if notified that they are under a duty to do so by the Home 
Secretary. But the question will be whether the safeguards are sufficient to avoid breaching 
Article 8 ECHR and/or Article 7 of the EU Fundamental Charter. 
 
The infrastructure for use of criminal prosecutions in a preventive as well as punitive sense, 
bearing in mind the possibility of suicide bombing, is already in place in the sense that very 
wide offences were introduced in the Terrorism Act 2006, including a preparatory offence 
catching very early-stage preparation for terrorist acts,
74
 and an offence of glorifying 
terrorism;
75
 the proscription-related offences in the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended, are very 
broad, and have a preventive aspect in that they catch membership of a proscribed 
organisation before any other TRA can occur.
76
 However, the inclusion of the very early 
intervention preparatory offence in s5 TA 2006 may be of limited efficacy in relation to ‘low-
tech’, random attacks by individuals not dependent on planning, expertise or a particular 
organisation, which is one form that ‘home grown’ terrorism in the UK appears to be 
taking.
77
  
                                                 
74
 Section 5 TA 2006. Between 2010-2013 there were 78 prosecutions under the TA 2000 and 20 under either 
Schedule 7 TA 2000 or other legislation (Home Affairs Committee ‘Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report,’ n 
18, p. 5). 
75
 Section 1(3) TA 2006.  
76
 For discussion see Helen Fenwick “The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate 
Response to 11 September?” (2002) 65(5) Modern Law Review 724, 757; Clive Walker “Terrorist offences: 
Terrorism Act 2000 s.11(1) – belonging to a proscribed organisation” Criminal Law Review [2005] 985. 
77
 See Home Affairs Committee ‘Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report,’ n 18, paras 12-13; Secretary of State 
for the Home Department “CONTEST The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism Annual 
Report” Cm 8583, March 2013, p. 8; April 2014, Cm 8848, p.15. In 2013 high profile examples of planned 
attacks in Luton, Rochdale and Yorkshire  appeared to be ‘low-tech’ and not centrally organised; see James 
Kelly, ‘Birmingham Men Guilty of Mass Bomb Plot’ BBC News, 21st February 2013 (see at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21534048  (last viewed 04.10.14)), Press Association ‘Luton terror plot: four 
Jailed  over plan to bomb army centre.’ the guardian 18th April 2013 
(http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/apr/18/luton-terror-plot-four-jailed (last viewed 04.10.14)), BBC News 
‘Terror Director Briton given life’ 19th December 2008 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7791602.stm (last viewed 
04.10.14)). The problem of “home grown terrorism” has, of course, become widely accepted since 7/7 which 
was perpetrated by British nationals; see further Alejandro Beutel, ‘Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorism in 
Western Muslim Communities’ Minaret of Freedom Institute, 30th August 2007, Section II, 
http://www.minaret.org/MPAC%20Backgrounder.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14). The murder of Lee Rigby in 
Woolwich in November 2013 provides an obvious example. Forms of ‘home-grown’ terrorism may currently be 
linked to a change in strategy by Al Qaeda and linked groups, whereby more spectacular, complex operations 
that can be fairly readily detected by Western intelligence agencies are being abandoned in favour of ‘lone wolf’ 
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The tendency in 2013-14 of a small number of young radicalised Muslims to travel to Syria 
or Iraq to fight with certain extremist groups, including ISIS,
78
 means that the offence of 
being present at a place used for training under the Terrorism Act 2006 s8
 
would probably
 
be 
applicable:
. 
section 8 prohibits anyone from being at a place where weapons training is going 
on (whether in the UK or abroad), provided the person knew or believed that training was 
happening, or a reasonable person would have known. It must also be proved that the training 
was provided for purposes connected with ‘acts of terrorism’. S6 of the 2006 Act prohibits 
anyone from training others in terrorist activities, or from receiving training, and also carries 
a maximum penalty of 10 years' imprisonment. There were a total of 69 arrests in the first 
half of 2014 for a range of offences: fundraising for terrorist activity; the preparation and/or 
instigation of terrorism acts; travelling abroad for terrorist training. But obviously the burden 
of proof is on the Crown to prove the different elements of the offence, which presents grave 
difficulties given the civil war in Syria and the conflict in Iraq. Someone who has travelled 
back to the UK via Turkey may have also been to Iraq, been trained by ISIS or have fought 
with them, but obtaining proof of so doing to the criminal standard is highly problematic. As 
a result, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe has recommended the introduction of a "rebuttable 
presumption" that anyone who visits Syria without prior notice to the authorities should be 
treated as a terror suspect.
79
 The government has rejected that possibility, but use of TPIMs 
which do not require proof to the criminal standard (under the 2015 Bill the standard of proof 
                                                                                                                                                        
strikes against soft targets such as high profile sporting events or shopping centres, where security is weak. See: 
J. Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism Understanding the Growing Threat (Prometheus books: Amherst, 2013). That 
also appears to be an ISIS tactic: it was reported on 18 Sept 2014 (see eg the Guardian coverage) that a  senior 
member of Islamic State was urging a ISIS supporters in Australia to carry out public beheadings, leading to the 
largest counter-terrorism raids in the country’s history. More than 800 police officers were involved in raids in 
Sydney’s north-west and 15 people were detained. 
78
 Estimated at 500; see BBC ‘Tracking Syria fighters now main task for MI5’ 20th June 2014; 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27947343 (last viewed 04.10.14).  
79
 Interview on LBC on 27
th
 August 2014, n 19. This proposal has also been put forward by Boris Johnson 
writing for the Telegraph: “Do nothing, and we invite the tide of terror to our door” the Telegraph, 24th August 
2014; http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/11054093/Do-nothing-and-we-invite-the-tide-of-terror-
to-our-front-door.html (last viewed 04.10.14).  
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will be raised to the civil standard: clause 16(1)) is a possible alternative, if the person in 
question can be identified. 
 
The definitions of TRA in TPIMA and in the ETPIM Bill overlap to an extent with a range of 
those existing offences.
80
 The infrastructure for preventive prosecution in cases involving 
material sensitive on national security grounds is also in place in the sense that some 
modifications to the criminal trial are possible, including enabling witness anonymity and 
using PII certificates or orders that entirely exclude the reporting of a criminal trial, a 
measure recently used by the CPS (to great controversy).
81
 These developments in the 
prosecutorial infrastructure in the two senses mentioned, may be being matched by enhanced 
security service and police cooperation in terrorism cases.
82
 It may be noted that the UK 
already has a better record than comparable allies, such as the US, in terms of prosecuting 
terrorism suspects in ordinary courts.
83
   
 
Diversification of non-trial based counter-terror measures rendering 
TPIMs otiose? 
  
                                                 
80
 TPIMA 2011 s4(1)(a)-(d) overlaps with TA 2006 ss 1-8. The definition of ‘terrorism’ governing TRA for the 
purposes of the TPIM/ETPIM legislation and for purposes of the various offences in ss1-8 TA 2006 is the same.  
81
 The order is possible under both the court’s ‘inherent jurisdiction’ and the Criminal Procedure Rules Pt 16, 
16.4 (in force from Oct 2013). An aspect of it was challenged in the Court of Appeal on the basis that no 
exceptional justification for both anonymising the defendants and conducting the proceedings in camera was 
apparent on the basis of a risk to the administration of justice: Guardian News and Media ltd v AB CD (2014) 
CO 2014/02393C1.  
82
 Intelligence and Security Committee “Annual Report 2012-2013” HC 547, July 2013, pp. 12-13.   
83
 See David Jenkins “The Closure of Guantanamo Bay: What Next for the Detainees” (2010) Public Law 46, 
56-57; Clive Walker “Prosecuting terrorism: the old Bailey versus Belmarsh” (2009) 79 Amicus Curae 22.  
EHRC “The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim communities” Research Report 72, 2011; 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/documents/research/counter-
terrorism_research_report_72.pdf (last viewed 04.10.14):  “In the decade since 9/11, 237 individuals have been 
convicted of terrorism-related offences. A further 48 (52) individuals have been made the subject of control 
orders. But the security services have estimated that 2,000 individuals represent a threat.” 
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We are currently seeing a diversification of counter-terror measures in the 2015 Bill, and 
proposed measures, which include: withdrawal of passports or citizenship; a range of new 
counter-radicalisation measures; curbs on liberty on the control orders model. That raises two 
questions in relation to TPIMs: if some British suspects could now be deported or otherwise 
excluded from the country, does or could that diminish their utility, bearing in mind that Part 
4 ACTSA and control orders were introduced partly to overcome the difficulty of 
deportation? Further, if, as discussed, the chances of prosecution of such suspects have 
increased, rather than rendering TPIMs more repressive as currently proposed, should TPIMs 
play a revised and diminished role amid the range of new and proposed measures?    
 
Withdrawal of passports or of citizenship; temporary exclusion orders  
 
Previously British citizens could not be stripped of their citizenship under deprivation of 
citizenship orders unless they had dual nationality.
84
 But under the Immigration  Act 2014 
there is now provision in s66 which amends the British Nationality Act 1981 (inserting s4A) 
                                                 
84
 Under section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981, as amended in 2006, the Home Secretary may make an 
order depriving a person of citizenship status if he or she is "satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public 
good". Such orders could not be used where they would leave the individual in question stateless usually 
because he/she does not have dual nationality (although it had appeared that it was not necessary for the person 
to hold another nationality before losing UK citizenship, provided they are deemed eligible to seek a passport 
from another country); the Supreme Court ruled unanimously in Al-Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62, [2013] 
WLR(D) 371 that the Home Secretary’s actions would illegally make the applicant, Hilal al-Jedda, stateless). In 
the Home Affairs Committee ‘Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report,’ n 18, para 98 et seq government 
proposals for removing British citizenship from foreign terror suspects, leaving them stateless (by Clause 18 of 
the Immigration Bill 2014), were considered; however, the plans were criticised for being reactive policy-
making (para 101) and the House of Lords rejected the amendment (HL Deb, Vol 753, Col 1167, 7
th
 April 
2014). The Home Affairs Committee further observed that even if the plans were implemented, it would still be 
necessary to find a state willing to receive them and that this fact might limit the utility of such a measure (para 
101). In general, the use of such Deprivation of Citizenship Orders on grounds that deprivation is conducive to 
the public good has increased recently (para 94-96) but reporting on its use remains limited; the Committee 
recommended quarterly reports to Parliament on the use of such measures, a level of accountability similar to 
that under the TPIMs reporting regime (para 96; TPIMA 2011 s19). The Home Secretary has targeted a number 
of dual-nationals using such orders (Hansard Briefing Note (Melanie Gower Home Affair Section) 
“Immigration Bill: Deprivation of Citizenship” SN/HA/682, May 2014  p. 7) and there were 24 such orders 
between 2006-2013; the Bureau of Investigative Journalism have an ongoing investigation into the use of this 
power: see Alice Ross and Patrick Galey “Citizenship Revoked: The 53 Britons stripped of nationality” May 
2014; http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/06/03/interactive-the-53-britons-stripped-of-their-nationality/ 
(last viewed 04.10.14).  
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to allow removal of citizenship if the conduct of the person is ‘seriously prejudicial to the 
vital interests of the UK, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory’ (s4A(b)), if the 
citizenship status results from the person’s naturalisation, and ‘the Secretary of State has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or 
territory outside the United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory’ 
(s4A(c)).
85
 Section 4A(c) overturns the findings of the Supreme Court in Al-Jedda
86
 to the 
effect that a person is rendered stateless if at the time when he is stripped of his citizenship he 
does not have another nationality. The Court found that it was not relevant that the person in 
question could have attained another nationality previously and would be likely still to be 
able to do so. S4A(c) was included in an attempt to comply with the 1954 Convention 
relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, but could render a person stateless where, despite showing the reasonable 
grounds in question, the person could not in practice attain another nationality. Therefore 
compliance may not have been achieved. The provision is highly controversial and racially 
charged since it makes citizenship dependent more on country of origin, than on country 
within which citizenship has been exercised. However, it has not been extended to cover 
persons born in Britain even where s4A(c) might apply (as well as s4A(b)).  
 
In 2013 the Home Secretary announced that she would exercise powers under the royal 
prerogative, to withdraw passports from terrorist suspects if so doing would be conducive to 
                                                 
85
 Section 66: Deprivation if conduct seriously prejudicial to vital interests of the UK: 
(1)In section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981 (deprivation of citizenship), after subsection (4) insert— 
“(4A)But that does not prevent the Secretary of State from making an order under subsection (2) to deprive a 
person of a citizenship status if (a)the citizenship status results from the person’s naturalisation, (b)the Secretary 
of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that 
citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory, and (c) the Secretary of State has 
reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the 
United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory.” 
86
 Al-Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62, [2013] WLR(D) 371; Theresa May discussed this point during the second 
reading of the Immigration Bill: 2014 HC Deb Vol 574, Col 1038, 30
th
 January 2014.    
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the public good or where the passport had been fraudulently obtained.
87
 The Home Office 
stance is to the effect that it would be "contrary to the public interest" to extend passport 
facilities to those whose activities are considered "undesirable". The package of counter-
terror measures in the new 2015 Bill, includes extending these powers to provide the police 
and border officials with the power to seize passports of those about to travel (in Schedule 1). 
A TPIM could also be employed to order a person, as a temporary measure to prevent travel, 
to surrender a passport at the nearest police station.  
 
David Cameron’s package of counter-terror measures now introduced in the 2015 Bill aimed 
at British born ‘jihadis’ include deploying temporary exclusion orders against British fighters 
in Syria and Iraq seeking to return to Britain, meaning that they would be held temporarily 
outside Britain for up to two years (Chapter 2 of the 2015 Bill, clauses 2-11). The rationale 
would obviously be that since they were seeking to return from Syria or Iraq via other states, 
in particular Turkey, it would probably be clear at the point of entering that country where 
they were returning from – which would not be the case once they had mingled with tourists 
returning from Turkey to the UK – and so they could be detained at that point and prevented 
from continuing by imposing the order. The individual can be given a permit to return to 
Britain (clause 4) if he or she complies with a range of conditions under Schedule 1 TPIMA 
(clause 8 of the 2015 Bill). These orders would stop short of stripping them of citizenship and 
thereby rendering them stateless, but in reality could have the same effects as withdrawing 
citizenship since such persons would not be able to enter the UK and might be deemed to be 
in limbo as far as their nationality was concerned with no territory to return to, except the 
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 See Gov.uk, “British passport eligibility”, 8th November 2013; https://www.gov.uk/british-passport-eligibility 
(last viewed 04.10.14) and Gov.uk HM Passport Office, “Royal prerogative”, 13 January 2012; 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/118554/royal-prerogative.pdf 
(last viewed 04.10.14). The power has been exercised 53 times since 2006: Melanie Gower “Deprivation of 
British citizenship and withdrawal of passport facilities” Briefing Paper, Home Affairs Section, SN/HA6820, 4 th 
September 2014, p.4.  
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community of fighters termed ISIS. (ISIS is of course not recognised as a state by the UK, 
and fails to display virtually any of the indicia of a state.)  
 
At present persons can be stripped of citizenship and have their passports withdrawn while 
inside or outside the UK, but only if they are dual nationals or naturalised citizens.
88
 The 
question would be whether a measure making a person in effect stateless even on a temporary 
basis would be contrary to international law.
89
 Proposals to seize passports to prevent return 
to Britain became mired in conflict between the Conservative leadership and the Liberal 
Democrats, and the legality of so doing is in doubt.
90
 Brief temporary detention of persons 
suspected of involvement with ISIS or related groups after reaching a Turkish airport, to 
allow identification, but with the intention of transporting them to the UK, where a 
prosecution could be instituted, if the evidence was available as to involvement with IS, or an 
TPIM/ETPIM could be imposed, would not appear however to infringe international law on 
statelessness. Removal of the passport creates a travel restriction but is not equivalent to de 
jure removal of nationality, and the intention to transport such persons to the UK would 
indicate that no de facto imposition of statelessness was occurring.
91
 If a temporary exclusion 
order is imposed on an individual, the British passport would be invalidated under the 2015 
Bill, clause 3(9). Given that the period during which the order could be in force is two years, 
                                                 
88
 Within s40(4),(4A) British Nationality Act 1981; see note 85. 
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 The 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness are the two international conventions that define who is a stateless person and set standards for 
protecting stateless persons. The right to a nationality is enshrined in the UDHR Art 15; see for discussion 
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 Patrick Wintour “Cameron shelves move to ban jihadists coming to UK” the Guardian, 1st September 2014; 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2014/sep/01/anti-terror-policy-legal-political-opposition-jihadis-uk (last 
viewed 04.10.14); Jon Craig “Doubts about legality of snatching passports” Sky News, 1st September 2014; 
http://news.sky.com/story/1328482/doubts-about-legality-of-snatching-passports (last viewed 04.10.14).  
91
 The situation would therefore not fall within the principle from Al-Jedda v SSHD [2013] UKSC 62, [2013] 
WLR(D) 371 (which concerned removal of citizenship, not merely of a passport) in which it was found that an 
individual with only a hypothetical past or future claim to a nationality may not be stripped of British citizenship 
([34]). 
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the argument that the person has been rendered de facto stateless for a significant period of 
time is reinforced.     
 
The withdrawal of citizenship from fighters in foreign conflicts – in particular in Syria or Iraq 
- who may have become more intensely radicalised or brutalised while fighting abroad, and 
may well have received weapons training, is now a possibility, unless the suspect was born in 
Britain.
92
 Such withdrawal could also apply to a number of the more high risk suspects
93
 who 
were previously subjected to control orders, then subjected to TPIMs.
94
 8 of the 9 suspects 
who were subject to TPIMs could not be detained pending deportation or extradition since 
they were all (bar one) British citizens; now that would depend on whether they were 
naturalised or born in Britain.
95
  
 
A new provision depriving a British citizen of their passport outside the UK, albeit on a 
temporary basis, or stripping persons other than those born in Britain of citizenship while 
abroad, or deporting them, would tend to diminish their access to the ECHR in practice, but 
they would still be entitled to exercise the rights, which however do not include a right to a 
nationality. Where use of such measures prevented a suspect from re-joining family members 
in Britain that would have obvious Article 8 ECHR implications, but the Immigration Act 
2014 s19 seeks to avoid successful Article 8 challenges based on the right to respect for a 
family life by providing that the courts must have regard to Parliament’s view of what the 
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 As recommended by the Home Affairs Committee ‘Counter-terrorism Seventeenth Report’, n 18, para 96. 
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 David Anderson, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, observed that “[t]he allegations against 
some TPIM subjects are at the highest end of seriousness, even by the standards of international terrorism. AM 
and AY are believed to have participated in the airline liquid bomb plot of 2006…” ‘TPIMS in 2013,’ n 14, para 
3.7; see also Alan Travis ‘Theresa May under pressure to reform counter-terrorism orders’ the Guardian, 
November 2013; http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2013/nov/05/theresa-may-counter-terrrorism-orders-
expire-january (last viewed 04.10.14). 
94
 TPIMA s 5.  
95
 Anderson ‘TPIMs in 2013’ n 14 para 3.3. 
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public interest requires – set out in s1996 - when considering Article 8 claims in immigration 
cases. Section 19 does not affect consideration of Article 7 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which provides a right to respect for private and family life, since it would appear that 
it would not be applicable to a person who had lost British citizenship under s66 since such a 
person would no longer be an EU citizen.
97
  
 
Counter-radicalisation  
 
The development of further targeted measures designed to disrupt and prevent radicalisation 
are currently being explored within and beyond the use of TPIMs.
98
 Further possible 
measures that are currently in contemplation – but were not in David Cameron’s 2014 
package of measures appearing in the 2015 Bill - include using anti-social behaviour orders, 
termed terror and extremist behaviour orders (TEBOs) directed towards community leaders 
or radical preachers of Wahabi or Salafist tendencies (such as Anjem Choudary) seeking to 
radicalise others.
99
 TEBOs could be deployed where the words spoken fell just outside the 
current glorification or incitement offences.
100
 As was the case in relation to Asbos, the 
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orders could result in criminal convictions carrying a jail term if breached. This de-
radicalising measure could fall within the Prevent framework which is directed towards 
supporting community leaders opposed to Salafism or Wahabism,
101
 for example, through the 
partnerships and interventions programme.
102
 A somewhat similar, but much broader 
proposal is for the introduction of Extremist Disruption Orders which would enable police to 
vet postings by extremists on Facebook and Twitter in advance and bar such persons from 
speaking at public events if they represent a threat to “the functioning of democracy”.103 
These new civil measures provide pathways to prosecution – but only for breach of their 
provisions, as should be openly acknowledged in debate as to their introduction. 
 
It has also been proposed that the current power of proscription should be broadened to allow 
the banning of groups espousing violent extremism but not directly involved in terrorism. 
Currently, the threshold for banning membership of organisations, requires the Home 
Secretary to prove that the group commits, prepares, promotes or is ‘otherwise concerned’ 
with terrorism.
104
 It is also provided in the 2015 Bill (Part 5, clause 21) that state-funded 
organisations, such as Universities, councils and schools, should have a new legal obligation 
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to combat extremists,
105
 and that local authorities should put in place panels to which 
individuals vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism could be referred (clause 28). 
 
Curbs on liberty on the control orders model – role of TPIMs 
 
As indicated, under the 2015 Bill the intention is to strengthen TPIMs, in particular by 
reinstating the ability to impose relocation (clause 12). So far the current government 
proposals in September 2014 and Parliamentary debate have not viewed the ETPIMs Bill as 
creating an alternative, although ETPIMs provide an existing potential alternative to TPIMs, 
and resemble control orders in terms of their ability to place stronger restrictions on suspects 
than are available under TPIMs, in particular to impose relocation. Once the 2015 Bill 
becomes law the higher standard of proof for the imposition of ETPIMs would be applied to 
TPIMs.
106
 But Parliamentary scrutiny is stronger than under TPIMA: the ETPIM Bill could 
be introduced as an emergency measure with a one year renewal period as opposed to the 5 
year period for TPIMA.
107
 ETPIMs, like TPIMs, also expire after two years unless new TRA 
is present when they can be renewed.
108
 If there is a case for the strengthening of TPIMs to 
meet the current threat level it would be met by introducing ETPIMs. ETPIMs, like control 
orders, can be ‘light’ or ‘heavy’ touch, and tailored to the degree of risk posed by the suspect. 
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They could be used to ban people from broadcasting or protesting in certain places, as well as 
associating with specific people. 
 
Strengthened TPIMs or ETPIMs would not necessarily breach Article 5 as a matter of 
domestic law if they imposed up to 14-16 hours house detention a day;
109
 nor would an 
obligation imposing forced relocation which did not impose an unusual degree of social 
isolation on the controlee.
110
 However, that result can only be reached by relying on a 
particular and limited domestic definition of the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ to place such 
measures outside Article 5’s ambit,111 and due to the uncertainty as to what would constitute 
unusual isolation use of forced relocation might be found to create such a deprivation in 
particular cases. If a derogation from Article 5 ECHR was sought instead under Article 15, 
covering TPIMs deployed specifically to meet the threat posed by jihadi fighters in the UK, 
returnees from the ISIS conflict, then the analysis of the proportionality of such measures to 
that threat would be conducted openly and transparently. Imposition of forced relocation 
under a derogation should be based on specifically targeted individual risk assessments. If a 
specific use of detention did not meet the threat posed by a particular applicant it would 
represent a disproportionate response, meaning that the derogation would be invalid and, 
while that finding itself would not determine the ambit of Article 5(1),
112
 Article 5 would be 
likely to be found to be breached.  
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But consideration of strengthening TPIMs should not be affected by the false promise of 
prosecution.
113
 The idea that TPIMs/ETPIMs are designed to enable investigation and 
prosecution of the individual in question should be openly abandoned.  Current debate as to their 
deployment should accept that they represent alternatives to prosecution, not pathways to it. In 
debating any balance that such measures might appear to strike between security and protection 
for human rights the prospect of prosecution should not be viewed as an aspect of the balancing 
act. It follows that TPIMs could also be modified to contain certain features likely to satisfy their 
purely preventive purpose, such as disallowing all access to social media, regardless of the 
notion that so doing could be inimical to the chances of prosecution. But use of ETPIMs instead 
would satisfy that purpose, although again the notion that they have an effective investigative 
role should be discarded in any deliberations as to their introduction. 
 
Contrary to the objectives of the 2015 Bill Part 2, the role of TPIMs could be reimagined as 
one not involving direct curbs on liberty. If there is a case under the current threat level for 
reinstating relocation as one of a range of restrictions it would be preferable to achieve that 
via ETPIMs, given their status as emergency measures. The current virtual abandonment of 
TPIMs implies that they have failed in their role as a curb on the movement of suspects; their 
utility in imposing short periods of detention over-night is unclear.
114
 Instead of strengthening 
them, if ETPIMs were introduced, TPIMs could be revised on their 5 year renewal and 
brought fully within the Prevent, rather than the Pursue strand of Contest, by deploying them 
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purely to counter radicalisation by inter alia barring persons from association with named 
others or from accessing certain internet materials. Redefining their role in this way would 
disassociate them from detention and from control orders. For the reasons given, the 
investigative label should also be dropped. Thus TPIMs could become part of the counter-
radicalisation strategy rather than acting as a coercive, liberty-depriving means of preventing 
terrorist activity. 
 
Conclusions 
 
A clearer divide should be created within the counterterror infrastructure between measures 
aimed at countering radicalisation and measures aimed at preventing terrorist activity at a 
later stage, after radicalisation has occurred. The use of control orders or TPIMs has it, is 
argued, blurred the line between the two and may also have contributed to a culture of 
criminal process avoidance. The criminal law is already taking and should continue to take the 
main role in coercive prevention of terrorist activity, given that the counter-terrorism offences 
available appear to be extensive enough to cover a range of preparatory acts, including planning 
to travel to support ISIS or related groups, or receiving training from them.  
 
In so far as a case can be made under the raised threat level for the continued use, in relation 
to a small and residual group of suspects, of civil restriction measures on the control orders 
model, the notion of combining ‘preventive’ and ‘investigative’ roles in non-trial-based 
measures is misjudged due to the conflict which, as argued, inevitably exists between the two 
objectives, and because the combination obscures the basis for deploying measures such as 
32 
 
TPIMs.
115
 The reasons for giving the preference to reliance on such measures, rather than 
criminal prosecutions in relation to particular suspects, appears to have provided a basis for 
avoiding prosecutions under the pretext that prosecution may only be delayed rather than 
ruled out, even where one of the very broadly-based early intervention terrorism offences 
might well have been applicable and a successful prosecution a possibility.
116
 Erosion of the 
concept of citizenship via s66 of the Immigration Act 2014 and some enhancement of the 
prospects of prosecution of terror suspects might appear to have undermined the rationale for 
relying on measures on the control orders model. But in so far as prosecutions of certain 
suspects are required due to the raised threat level, but are genuinely problematic on national 
security grounds, there is a case for relying on the emergency measures of ETPIMs, possibly 
combined with a derogation, rather than on more ‘normalised’ TPIMs. However, it appears 
that the range of new measures, including proposed ones, are merely to be added to 
strengthened TPIMs, rather than viewed as a possible basis for abandoning that scheme. 
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